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Abstract
This article provides an overview of intimate threats: a class of privacy threats that can arise within
our families, romantic partnerships, close friendships, and caregiving relationships. Many common
assumptions about privacy are upended in the context of these relationships, and many otherwise
effective protective measures fail when applied to intimate threats. Those closest to us know the
answers to our secret questions, have access to our devices, and can exercise coercive power over
us. We survey a range of intimate relationships and describe their common features. Based on
these features, we explore implications for both technical privacy design and policy, and offer de-
sign recommendations for ameliorating intimate privacy risks.
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Introduction
The information security community tends to focus its attention on
a canonical set of attackers: companies tracking our activities online,
criminals looking to steal our data, government agencies surveilling
us to gather information, and hackers out for the “lulz.” But a huge
number of threats are much more quotidian, performed by much
less powerful and less technically savvy actors with very different
motives and resources. These attackers know their victims well, and
have much greater access to their information, devices, and lives in
general. We call these attacks intimate threats, in which one member
of an intimate relationship—a spouse, a parent, a child, or a friend,
for example—violates the privacy of the other.
Intimate threats have garnered little explicit attention from the
security and privacy communities and from system designers. For
example, a recent review of 40 academic analyses of smart home se-
curity anticipated 29 different threat actors and 100 different types
of threats—but the threat model of a domestic abuser was almost
entirely absent across the literature [1]. We argue that these threats
ought to be treated as a primary concern.
Intimate threats represent the way a huge number of people
actually experience insecurity and privacy invasions every day.
These threats are so common as to be treated as routine and often
overlooked, but they are experienced much more frequently—and
often with greater direct impact on victims’ lives—than many of the
threats that dominate the security discussion. And they dispropor-
tionally impact society’s most vulnerable and least powerful people,
often including women, children, the elderly, and the physically or
cognitively impaired. Though these threats are, by their nature, diffi-
cult to definitively quantify, the indicators we have suggest the scope
and scale of intimate threats. In one survey, 31% of participants
admitted to snooping through another person’s phone without per-
mission in the past year [2]. A recent Pew survey found that the ma-
jority of parents check their teenagers’ browsing histories and social
media profiles. Forty-eight percent looked through phone records
and text messages, and 16% tracked teens’ locations via their cell
phones; half reported knowing the password to their teenager’s
email account [3]. An NPR survey of US domestic violence shelters
indicated that 85% of shelters had worked with survivors who had
been stalked using GPS devices, and that 75% had helped survivors
who had been subject to eavesdropping using remote tools [4]. A
survey in the UK found that 85% of abuse survivors reported being
subject to online abuse as part of a pattern of their abuse more gen-
erally [5]. Taken together, figures like these suggest that privacy
invasions by intimates are pervasive and deserving of focused study.
In addition to being important on their own, intimate threats can
be precursors to more traditional forms of privacy and security
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threat. Intimate privacy invasions can result in the destruction of
valuable or personal data, like financial records or family photo-
graphs. They can be the first step in financial fraud. In abusive part-
ner situations, they can be a precursor to physical, emotional, and
sexual abuse [6, 7]. And even well-intentioned intimate monitoring
can create a slippery slope of acceptability, inuring users to accept-
ing surveillance as a mode of social control in other contexts [8].
Finally, a more systematic consideration of intimate threats
stands to benefit socio-technical security research as a field. These
threats pose difficult technical challenges, made more complex by
the social relationships in which they are embedded—which are
marked by different degrees of authority and autonomy within rela-
tionships. They present a mixture of motivations for privacy inva-
sion, often including beneficent motivations like protection and
care. They pose novel and interesting questions about privacy boun-
daries: what degree of monitoring is socially and normatively ac-
ceptable in intimate relationships, and how system designers might
best accommodate divergent and dynamic preferences. Directly
addressing these issues extends the field and provides designers with
an opportunity to better address real-world situations. In this way,
our work fits into a broader scheme of research that prioritizes
the sociotechnical and behavioral dimensions of security and privacy
across different social contexts, and which recognizes the critical
importance of interdisciplinary approaches to developing solutions
[9–11].
Our goals in this article are twofold. While emerging research
has begun to examine privacy threats within particular intimate rela-
tionships, we are aware of no work that synthesizes common char-
acteristics or design considerations of these threats from across
intimate contexts. Our first goal, then, is to describe intimate threats
as a class of privacy problems, drawing out the features that charac-
terize the category. Many of these features involve the violation of
implicit assumptions that hold more readily in other contexts of
privacy threat. A better understanding of these common features is
required to more adequately protect against intimate threats.
Our second goal is to articulate a set of design considerations
that is cognizant of intimate threats. These are difficult problems,
and our intention is not to prescribe an exhaustive “checklist” that
will immunize a technological system against all intimate threats.
Rather, we aim to supply researchers, designers, and policymakers
with a conceptual toolkit for recognizing and taking these threats
seriously, as well as a critical assessment of the design trade-offs
they entail.
Monitoring in intimate relationships
An extensive amount of monitoring routinely occurs across many
types of intimate relations, from romantic partners, to parent–child
relationships, to roommates, to caregivers. Family members, room-
mates, and close friends often know each other’s whereabouts and
with whom the other spends time. Long-term partners often share
bank accounts and keep track of each other’s financial activities.
Roommates answer each other’s phone calls—regularly on a shared
home landline, and sometimes on each other’s cell phones. People
living in the same household may share computers, phones, and
other connected devices. Intimates might share social media and
email accounts [12]—and even if they have separate accounts, they
may know one another’s passwords [13–15]. Depending on how
their devices and accounts are configured, they may have access (in-
tentionally or not) to each other’s files, browsing history, and more.
Smart home devices are shared by necessity, and give family mem-
bers access to a great deal of information about each other’s where-
abouts and activities.
People may willingly share access to accounts and devices for a
number of benign and useful social, cultural, and economic reasons
[12, 16]. They may do so as a practical component of household
management and communication [16], or because it is cost-effective
to pool resources within the family. They may do so to establish and
demonstrate intimacy [17] or trust [18, 19] in a partner, or as a con-
dition of access. Personal preferences and cultural expectations fur-
ther complicate matters.1 Some partners may desire not only to
monitor an intimate partner, but also to be monitored, for conveni-
ence (e.g., “I like my partner to know when I’m on my way home so
we can make evening plans”) [21], for safety (e.g., to inform trusted
contacts of one’s location to provide a “virtual escort” while walk-
ing alone) [22], or for other reasons. In other contexts, there may be
social or cultural assumptions of family access and sharing, often
along gendered lines [23, 24]. (In fact, some industry groups have
gone so far as to say that because devices are often shared within
households and families, device identifiers should not be considered
“personally identifying” under privacy laws [25].)
Much of this access is not necessarily nefarious, intentional, or
even unwelcome. In many cases, it simply reflects how people
choose to organize their households and relationships, and the role
of digital technologies within them. But intimacy also presents dis-
tinct informational vulnerabilities. Those who sit in intimate rela-
tion to us hold unique resources that can be brought to bear to gain
access to our data or devices. Intimates may marshal those resources
for a variety of purposes, up to and including abuse. And even in
non-abusive situations, members of close relationships may find it
almost impossible to protect their own privacy interests against one
another, thanks in large part to assumptions built into common
technical infrastructures.
Intimate monitoring brings unique ethical complications to the
fore [26, 27]. In most privacy contexts, there’s little question about
the impropriety of unauthorized access. But in intimate settings,
some unauthorized access would strike many as warranted—or even
required—as a component of a duty of care [28]. Family members
have a moral, economic, and often legal responsibility to take care
of one another and ensure each other’s safety, security, and well-
being; they often leverage data-gathering technologies in doing so.
Indeed, there are many cases in which it seems both normatively and
practically unfathomable that intimates not be privy to one anoth-
er’s data. For instance, medical and educational data from minor
children must be made available to their parents—who bear respon-
sibility for children’s care in both respects—and applicable laws spe-
cifically provide that parents should have such access in many
cases.2
The fact that intimate information-sharing is widespread and
often accepted should not lead us to be unreflective about very real
privacy threats within intimate relationships. Rather, it makes it all
the more important to consider how intimate privacy threats occur,
1 For an example of such monitoring that many would find abhorrent, see
this about women in Saudi Arabia [20].
2 For example, in the USA, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA) gives parents access to their children’s educational records up
until age 18; even after age 18, schools may choose to disclose certain
records to parents in some cases (e.g., in cases of an emergency, or if the
child is claimed as a dependent) [29]. Indeed, the tension between paren-
tal notification and a child’s privacy can be a difficult one for institutions
to navigate, as when colleges do not notify parents of children’s psycho-
logical difficulties [30].
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when they are unwelcome, and how to reason about them conceptu-
ally. The line between watching and watching over is a blurry one.
Even in close, loving, and generally functional relationships, privacy
invasions can at times be cause for conflict and anxiety [31]. There
are no bright-line rules for determining when duties of care and pro-
tection override privacy interests in intimate relationships, nor for
whether intimate monitoring crosses a line of appropriateness.
Intentions can be intertwined in the same monitoring relationship
(“I want to see when my wife is on her way home so I can start din-
ner, but I also want to make sure she isn’t going near X’s house”)
and can change over time and circumstance. Variable preferences
and norms about data sharing in intimate relationships present spe-
cial challenges to designing privacy into these systems; they are not a
reason to ignore these threats.
Victims of intimate privacy threat typically lack legal recourse.
Judges and legislators are generally loath to intervene too strongly in
what is often considered the “sacred” space of the intimate sphere,
tending to protect the privacy of families vis-a`-vis the state rather
than privacy within the family [32–34]. This is even more true in
patriarchal societies that grant men in the family stronger rights and
freedoms (e.g., Turkey [35]); in Saudi Arabia, for example, where all
women are required to have a male guardian, a government-run
website permits men to grant or deny women under their guardian-
ship the right to travel, and to set up notifications so that they re-
ceive a text message should a woman in their family try to get on an
airplane [20]. In the USA, some legal protections do exist against the
most egregious abuses—protections against nonconsensual pornog-
raphy [36, 37], no-contact orders following episodes of intimate
partner violence, and so on—but the law has generally had trouble
keeping up with the challenges of digitally mediated intimate abuse
[38–40]. And in the contexts of intimate privacy violations that do
not rise to the level of abuse (like child tracking), the law offers vir-
tually no remedy, often due to the assumption that a caretaker’s
preferences are aligned with the interests of the person being moni-
tored [41, 42].
We conceive of intimate privacy threats broadly in this article.
Though we use the words “attack,” “attacker,” and “victim” to
characterize aspects of these threats, these may sometimes seem to
describe normal—even accidental—interactions between people
with no specific malicious motivations toward one another. Our use
of these words aligns our inquiry with the dominant discourse in se-
curity discussions and threat modeling, in which the terms merely in-
dicate who is attacking and defending a system and do not have any
moral or pejorative connotations [43, 44]. Many of the privacy inva-
sions we discuss in this article are quite casual; attackers need not
necessarily act with bad intent, nor plan to use the information
gleaned for abusive or illegal purposes. It may be helpful to concep-
tualize some intimate threats as involuntary disclosure of a victim’s
information to an attacker, at times even without the attacker hav-
ing a specific intent to obtain that information.
Types of intimate attackers and victims
All intimate relationships—and the privacy practices and expecta-
tions within them—are different. We characterize here some of the
most prevalent relationships that may give rise to privacy threats
and summarize some of the existing research that examines each
context. The scope of intimate relationships with which we concern
ourselves follows Hasday’s definition of intimates as including
“dates, sexual and/or romantic partners, and family members such
as spouses, parents, and children” [34, p. 6]; we consider in-family
caregivers (e.g., nannies) and friends/roommates, as well. (Hasday
argues that no “ideal and unassailable definition of intimacy exists”;
like her, we adopt a “working definition” based on common under-
standing of the term, without firmly fixed boundaries.)
Intimate partners
Privacy threats commonly emerge in romantic partnerships.
Significant others may invade one another’s privacy for a variety of
reasons, ranging from casual to abusive, over the course of a roman-
tic relationship.
Perhaps the most alarming example of privacy invasion in a ro-
mantic relationship is in the case of intimate partner violence and
abuse. Nearly one in three women and one in six men will experi-
ence abuse at some point over the course of their lives [45]. In an
increasing proportion of these cases, abusers use digital tools to per-
petuate abuse and control over the victim: tracking a victim’s loca-
tion, monitoring their communications, harassing and threatening
them, and otherwise surveilling or restricting their activities [6, 7,
46, 47]. These behaviors commonly begin in early dating relation-
ships, and often accompany or prefigure other forms of abuse [47].
Abusers have used a variety of digital tools to spy on or exert
control over their victims, most of which require minimal technical
sophistication. Some abusers use off-the-shelf spyware apps, which
are commonly available online and on app stores; these applications
run in the background on victims’ mobile phones and computers,
reporting their activities back to an abuser surreptitiously [48, 49].
Abusers also make use of a number of commonplace digital tools
for abusive purposes. Smart home and IoT technologies such as re-
mote web-enabled cameras, home appliances, thermostats, speakers,
and other home sensors can be used by abusers to stalk, harass, and
monitor victims and their activities [50, 51]. One company markets
a mattress that detects and reports “suspicious movements in the
bed” [52].
Even more commonly, abusers rely on the ease of access facili-
tated by knowledge of the victim’s passwords (sometimes shared
under threat, other times voluntarily as a sign of trust [19, 53]),
answers to security questions, and other authentication mechanisms.
Sometimes authentication can by bypassed altogether—for example,
the abuser may be able to keep track of the victim’s communications
because they share a family plan for cellular service, or via browser
history on a shared computer [46, 54]. Child-tracking apps and
employee-tracking apps are easily repurposed for surreptitiously
monitoring intimate partners, and there are some indications that
their developers are aware of and condone such use [48]. Social
media also presents an easy route toward tracking, as many plat-
forms offer up information like a user’s location while posting or an
indicator of whether the user is actively on the site. Many shared
services record usage history, which can be used to monitor a
partner.
Privacy invasions in the context of intimate partner abuse are es-
pecially egregious and provide a noncontroversial (and important)
rallying point for taking intimate threats seriously. But privacy inva-
sions between romantic partners aren’t restricted to these extreme
cases, and we ought to take intimate privacy seriously even in the
absence of abusive circumstances. For instance, many partners col-
lect data about one another routinely and harmlessly in the context
of courtship (e.g., “Facebook stalking” a prospective date), sexual
relationships, relationship management, or as a way to “gamify”
aspects of romantic love [17, 32, 55, 56]. Many fertility- and
pregnancy-focused apps grant partners a degree of surveillance over
one another (most commonly, male partners over female partners)
Journal of Cybersecurity, 2020, Vol. 6, No. 1 3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cybersecurity/article-abstract/6/1/tyaa006/5849222 by guest on 02 June 2020
[57]. For example, one service prompts a man to offer his pregnant
partner a glass of water if his version of the app suggests she may be
dehydrated [32]. Several period trackers issue “alerts” to men when
their partners are menstruating; one even provides the capability to
track several women’s periods at once, tracking each with a separate
password “so when you punch it in, it only looks like you’re track-
ing her” [32].
In other cases, partners may monitor each other when they doubt
the responsibility of each other’s behavior; for example, parents
who travel commonly report “checking in” on their partner via
web-enabled baby monitor to see if the baby has been put to bed
properly. Soberlink, a facial-recognition-augmented breathalyzer, is
sometimes ordered by courts as a condition of visitation when one
parent has a history of alcoholism. If the alcoholic parent (the
“monitored client”) fails to breathe clean, a text is sent to the other
partner (the “concerned party”) as an indication that it is not safe
for the children to visit that day [58].
Additionally, partners are sometimes “caught” being unfaithful
via monitoring unbeknownst to them. For example, the governor of
Alabama’s furtive texts to his paramour were being synced to his
wife’s iPad [59]. In another story, an Internet-connected smart scale
sent the weight measurement of someone’s illicit lover to his part-
ner’s phone [60]. In these cases, there’s a tendency to view the un-
faithful partner as a villain who had it coming, rather than as a
person whose privacy preferences were disrespected by poor design
[12]. But from a privacy-protective perspective, we ought to be ag-
nostic as to the nature of the behavior or content detected, and be
fundamentally concerned with how technology may facilitate invol-
untary information-sharing.
Parents and minor children
Parents routinely monitor their children in the course of caring for
them, from infancy (and even beforehand, in utero) through adoles-
cence [61]. Some degree of parental monitoring is essential to ensure
children’s safety and well-being. Indeed, as parents’ lives become
busier, parents are often lambasted or punished for giving children
significant autonomy—a burden disproportionately felt by women
of color and at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale. Mothers
have been charged with child abuse and endangerment for letting
their children wait in the car or play in a park unsupervised while
they run errands or attend job interviews [62]. This risk of being per-
ceived as a neglectful parent, combined with a lack of social or gov-
ernmental infrastructure for providing childcare resources, provides
an incentive for parents to digitally track their children. Fear-based
marketing exacerbates this impetus by cultivating a sense of general-
ized anxiety in parents—one that can most readily be ameliorated
through monitoring [28].
Monitoring often continues well into the teenage years, as differ-
ent risks become salient to parents. Many parents know the pass-
words of their children’s accounts and regularly check on their
online activities, perhaps as a condition of use [63]. Parents have
been held responsible for their children’s illegal file downloads or
sexting behavior, creating legal obligations that result from failing
to supervise teens’ online activity [64, 65]. As discussed earlier, a
Pew survey found that most parents engaged in some form of moni-
toring of teens’ browsing histories and social media profiles, and
half had their teens’ email passwords [3]. A separate study found
that parents with home-entryway surveillance systems routinely
monitor the comings and goings of their teenage children [66].
Parental monitoring software is commonly marketed to aid parents
in many of these activities [28, 48]. On the more extreme end of the
spectrum, parents may purchase tamperproof ankle bracelets and
GPS monitoring services for “high-risk” teens [67].
The balance between essential caretaking and privacy invasion
can be unclear [68, 69]. On one hand, parents have a duty to super-
vise their children, and implicit authority to place limits on their
activities and communications. Parental control apps like Google’s
Family Link allow parents to view children’s online activity and de-
vice location, under the advertised purpose of letting parents “set
digital ground rules to help guide” their children online [70]. On the
other hand, some have raised concerns that the normalization of
parental surveillance quashes developmentally important childhood
freedoms and trust-building—particularly as children get older—as
well as children’s freedom of expression and access to information
[71–73]. Child monitoring apps like Bark, for example, alert parents
when its algorithms detect profanity, sexting, or indicators of de-
pression in a child’s social media or text exchanges [74]. Toys like
Hello Barbie record children’s conversations with the doll and, un-
beknownst to them, email the audio files to their parents [75]. A re-
cent Google patent proposes that its smart home system can “infer
mischief” if its audio and motion sensors detect that children are
occupying a room—but are too quiet [76]. All have prompted scru-
tiny from privacy researchers.
Parents may also violate their children’s privacy for reasons
wholly unrelated to caretaking. Parents may fraudulently use a
child’s identity for purposes of opening lines of credit and other
accounts. Though the prevalence of such fraud is difficult to estab-
lish empirically, research suggests that when a child’s identity is sto-
len, their parents are the most likely perpetrators [77].
In other contexts, the tables may be turned: young children may
be privacy threats to their parents. Children are often the savviest
technology consumers in their own families, and often act as
“sysadmins” within them; in the course of this role, they may inci-
dentally or deliberately gain access to detailed digital information
about their parents [78]. And children may have motivations to use
this information for personal gain—stealing money from parents’
bank accounts, using parents’ passwords to gain access to proscribed
media, using their credit cards, and the like. Notably, some authenti-
cation mechanisms may be less effective for one’s children for rea-
sons having to do with biological similarity. The chance of a
random person unlocking someone else’s Apple’s Face ID—used for
authentication on the iPhone X—is only one in one million, accord-
ing to Apple’s whitepaper on the topic—but “[t]he probability of a
false match is different for twins and siblings that look like you as
well as among children under the age of 13, because their distinct fa-
cial features may not have fully developed” [79]. Indeed, cases of
children unlocking their parents’ iPhones with the children’s own
faces have been reported in the media [80].
Adult children and elderly parents
As the world’s population ages, a growing number of families find
themselves charged with caring for elderly relatives [42]. The corre-
sponding demand for care—along with meager state resource alloca-
tions to support such care—leave many families dependent on
remote monitoring technologies to make these burdens tractable.
Some families use video monitoring equipment, colloquially
known as “granny cams,” to keep tabs on the safety and well-being
of elderly relatives [42, 81]. In nursing homes and assisted living
facilities, families often deploy web-enabled cameras in residents’
rooms. The use of these cameras is often motivated by concern
about the resident being abused or neglected at the hands of staff or
another resident [42]. Roughly 10% of elderly adults (across all care
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settings) are estimated to be victims of physical, sexual, or psycho-
logical abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation [82]. And nursing
home residents are considered to be among the most vulnerable: ap-
proximately half of nursing home residents suffer from Alzheimer’s
disease or related dementias [83], and abuse is believed to be signifi-
cantly underreported among populations afflicted with these condi-
tions [84].
But familial monitoring of elderly relatives presents its own set
of privacy threats. The same cognitive impairments that make nurs-
ing home residents susceptible to abuse may also make them unable
to give meaningful consent to being monitored by a relative. When
this is the case, the capacity for consent typically defaults to the resi-
dent’s “representative,” who is most commonly the family member
who is instigating monitoring in the first place [42]. A huge variety
of intimate activities—including bathing, dressing, medical care,
sexual activity, and personal conversations—takes place in residents’
rooms. Since 2001, seven states have implemented statutes and regu-
lations governing families’ use of cameras there—but the majority of
such legislation does not account for inconsistent privacy preferen-
ces between the resident and the family representative (nor do they
account for potential abuse situations within the familial relation-
ship). Instead, they tend to treat the family member’s decisions as a
precise extension of the interests of the elderly resident [42].
Alternatively, families may monitor an elderly relative to support
“aging in place”—that is, as a condition of permitting the relative to
remain in a private home, often alone, rather than moving them to a
facility where they would have better access to medical services but
might lose desired independence [85]. Cameras are also often used
in these contexts, as well as a variety of other technologies that give
a family member oversight over the activities of the elderly relative.
These commonly include monitoring of health outcomes and behav-
iors, like adherence to prescriptions (like “smart” pills and pill bot-
tles that notify someone if a family member fails to take medicines
on time [86, 87]), safety and mobility issues (like Lifeline systems
that detect falls [88]), and a variety of smartphone apps, GPS track-
ers, and in-home sensor systems that track things like temperature,
doors opening and closing, and the presence of visitors [89]. The
common denominator among such technologies is a rhetoric of en-
ablement: but for the peace of mind that they ensure, the elderly
relative would no longer be able to live independently [90]. As is the
case in other intimate relationships, family members’ monitoring of
elderly relatives is very often motivated by care and a desire to pro-
tect. Yet, research suggests that the privacy preferences of monitored
relatives often diverge. In one study, adult children of elderly moth-
ers had consistently more favorable views of sensor, camera, and lo-
cation tracking technologies than their mothers did—but the adult
children typically thought they could persuade their mothers to give
consent to being monitored [91].
Other caregivers and their charges/patients/dependents
Similar intimate threats arise in the context of paid care work. An
increasing amount of intimate care is outsourced to nannies, baby-
sitters, and workers who care for the elderly and infirm. The pres-
ence of these workers as intermediaries in care relations introduces
further opportunities and incentives for intimate monitoring, as well
as additional complexities related to the employment relationship.
These workers may themselves monitor their charges, using the
same sorts of tools, and based on the same sorts of motivations, as
described above. They may also be the targets of monitoring by their
employer (or by a government agency that subsidizes the care)—to
ensure that they do their work to a satisfactory level, to allay
concerns that they may steal from the household, and to ensure the
safety and health of their charges [92]. This monitoring commonly
occurs via nanny cams and distributed surveillance platforms like
Nannysightings.com, through which parents can report to one an-
other on caregivers’ behaviors [28]. Extensive monitoring can also
occur in the context of hiring and screening caregivers: the service
Predictim, for instance, analyzed prospective babysitters’ social
media histories in order to predict their propensity for drug abuse
and bullying (before Facebook and Twitter curtailed their access to
do so) [93].
Besides being attackers or victims of attacks themselves, paid
caretakers can also be used as a justification for more monitoring of
the dependent by the person who contracts for their care. For ex-
ample, the threat of abuse at the hands of nursing home workers is
used as a justification for putting elderly residents on cameras moni-
tored by family members (despite the fact that most elder abuse is
perpetrated by family members, not care workers), potentially
resulting in invasions of the elderly resident’s privacy by their family
[42, 81]. Similarly, some day-care centers offer web cameras for
parents to monitor the type and quality of care their children receive
(see, for example, [94]).
Friends
Of course, privacy threats can also arise within friendships. Friends
often share intimate details of their lives with each other; in fact, the
willingness to reveal private information to one another can be
understood as an indicator of trust and closeness in the relation [8].
Friends may be roommates and share common physical space. But
as with other sorts of intimate relations, friends can be controlling
and retaliatory, and friendships can sour. As such, they can share
many of the same characteristics as other intimate relationships.
This class of risk can be further exacerbated by the inexperience
and naı¨vete´ of youth, and by the transitory nature of friendships and
partnerships among teens and tweens [53]. Young people manage,
define, and maintain their relationships with one another by differ-
entiating the access they allow to some friends versus others (e.g.,
allowing some friends—but not others—to know one’s location on a
“Find My Friends” app) [8].
Common features of intimate threats
Having reviewed various relations in which intimate threats can res-
ide, we turn now to drawing out features that frequently character-
ize intimate threats across these relational contexts, as described in
existing research—many of which set them apart from traditional
privacy contexts. Clearly, individual situations will vary; these fea-
tures will be present and more or less salient in different relation-
ships. We enumerate four such features here, and in the following
section describe their implications for policy and design.
Feature 1: Attackers may have multiple motivations—
including beneficent ones—often tied to emotion
Attacker motivations in intimate settings are often very different
than in other privacy contexts. Although there are certainly instan-
ces of intimates stealing money and other things of value from each
other, in general, intimate attacks are more likely to be motivated by
an attacker seeking knowledge of, and possibly control over, anoth-
er’s behaviors [95]. Sometimes these motivations are premised on
positive inclinations like love, caretaking, and perceived protection
from internal and external dangers. There may be a strongly held
(and legally supported) sense of duty to “look after” intimate
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relations, and privacy invasions may be justified as being “for their
own good”—particularly when one party is much more vulnerable,
like a child, elderly adult, or a family member with reduced physical
or cognitive capacity.
In other cases, the motivation may be control for control’s sake,
jealousy, or fear. In abusive situations, the motivations may be a de-
sire to cause emotional or even physical harm, retaliation for a per-
ceived wrong, or preventing a victim from seeking help or
extrication from the situation [6]. On both ends of the spectrum,
emotion plays a strong role in motivating behavior, and advertising
often plays on those emotions to market monitoring tools [28].
These emotional motivations mean that normal considerations
about whether an attack is “worth it” can fail in the context of in-
timate relations. Because an attacker may be motivated by a range
of factors—ranging from deep love and care to obsession, jealousy,
or desire for control, and with a good deal of variation in individual,
cultural, and relational preferences—dispassionate, rational cost-
benefit analysis of threats and resources is unlikely to be easily
applied to intimate threats. One of us (Bruce) remembers that as a
child he once brute-forced a combination padlock in his house. A
four-digit lock’s 10,000 possible combinations might be enough to
keep out a burglar, but fail against a child with unlimited access and
nothing better to do that day.
Feature 2: Copresence facilitates device and account
access
In many privacy contexts, attackers and victims are assumed, at least
implicitly, to occupy physically separate spaces. Physical separation
helps to ensure that authentication mechanisms and access creden-
tials create security. This assumption rarely holds true in intimate
relationships. We borrow here from Goffman’s use of the term
copresence to describe situations in which two actors share physical
space, facilitating “rich[] information flow” between them such that
people “are close enough to be perceived in whatever they are
doing” [96, p. 17]. In intimate relationships, people very commonly
share physical space—they live together in households, spend time
together in public and private settings, and otherwise have high
degrees of physical access that facilitates information transmission
about each other. Copresence has a number of implications for in-
timate threats, as we describe here.
Shared physical spaces and proximity among threat, victim, and
devices create different vulnerabilities than those threats premised
solely on remote digital access [46]. Copresence allows attackers to
access a victim’s devices physically, facilitating information visibility
(including “over the shoulder” threats such as reading the victim’s
screen, watching them enter their passwords, and so on [19, 54,
97]), as well as easier installation of spyware [48]. Many smart-
phone apps default to presenting messages and communications on
the phone’s locked screen, a potential vulnerability if a user’s intim-
ate also has access to the physical device. Other information may
be transmitted through jointly used resources in a shared space: a
family might have a single shared computer, or a common backup
system for all the household’s computers.
Copresence can also reduce the effectiveness of security measures
like two-factor authentication. The most common second factor is a
smartphone, to which intimate attackers often have at least intermit-
tent access. This can enable them to read any one-time access codes
displayed on the locked screen. Copresence can even defeat biomet-
ric authentication. In one published incident, a woman unlocked her
husband’s smartphone by placing his sleeping hand on the finger-
print reader [98].
Further, copresence compounds the forms of attack to which a
victim is vulnerable. Unlike a physically distant privacy threat whose
access to the victim is entirely digital,3 an intimate attacker may ex-
pose a victim to other forms of attack, like physical, sexual, emo-
tional, and financial abuse. In some cases, to avoid escalation via
other abuse vectors, victims’ advocates may advise a victim not to
cut off the abuser’s digital access, because doing so can lead to escal-
ation of abuse in other forms [6]. Counterintuitively, then, it may be
in the victim’s best interest not to immediately ameliorate digital
threats, or even to indicate their awareness of them.
Finally, because many people are involved in family relation-
ships, attackers may leverage other co-present family members in
the service of monitoring another. For example, some survivors of
intimate partner abuse report that even if they maintain digital se-
curity on their own devices, they can be indirectly monitored via
devices controlled by a shared child [46].
Feature 3: Intimate relationships have inherent,
dynamic power differentials, backed by explicit or
implicit authority
Privacy invasion often accompanies and extends existing vectors of
relational power [6]. In many cases, the monitored party has rela-
tively less power in the relation by virtue of age, various forms of de-
pendency (legal, financial, and so on), social norms (men having
authority over women in some cultures), or reduced capacity (chil-
dren, victims of intimate partner violence, elderly adults with de-
mentia, and so on). Intimate threats are very likely the threats most
frequently experienced by women, children, and those with disabil-
ities. Power dynamics are also likely to change over time—as the na-
ture of a romantic relationship changes, as children age, as an
adult’s cognitive abilities decline and he becomes more dependent
on caregivers, and so on.
In many cases of intimate threat, the attacker has decision-
making authority over the victim: granted either explicitly by law,
or implicitly by the design of the system. Examples of explicit au-
thority are parental rights and responsibilities to access a child’s
data or to vicariously consent to monitoring on that child’s behalf
[99], or a power of attorney for someone with diminished capacity.
This authority may undermine consent-based models of privacy
protection: the attacker both has authority to consent on behalf of
the victim and is themselves a threat to the victim’s privacy, creat-
ing a circular (and nonprotective) situation [42]. And some legal
frameworks explicitly permit or require data sharing between inti-
mates, like the provision of student data to parents under FERPA,
court-ordered alcohol monitoring for parental visitation, or state
statutes that permit families to record their loved ones in nursing
homes.
An attacker’s authority may also be implicit, based on ownership
or expertise. For example, the person who pays for a phone family
plan may have the capability of accessing data for all users.
Decisions about installation and use of smart home monitoring sys-
tems are often driven by the individual in the house with the most
expertise and control over the household; Geeng and Roesner [100]
found that these decision-makers often didn’t consult other members
of the household about these decisions because “they did not con-
sider them equal decision-makers in the home.” Power differentials
also imply that coercion can be an important enabler of surveillance
3 But see some complications of this in contexts like swatting.
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in intimate relationships. Intimate attackers can coerce or threaten
their victims to keep their smartphones unlocked, divulge the
passwords to their social media accounts, or enable location track-
ing [101].
Feature 4: Attackers may bring deep knowledge
resources to bear in order to exploit relational
vulnerabilities
Privacy infringements in intimate relationships tend to be technically
simple. They can involve no more than using readily available device
and account interfaces, and attackers need not have great technical
skill to execute attacks. But what these attacks lack in technical so-
phistication, they make up in relational complexity. Simply because
of their extensive knowledge of the victim, intimate attackers have
deep relational resources that they can leverage in several ways.
Attackers may use intimate knowledge of the victim to gain ac-
cess to accounts [46]. Much of this information is shared willingly
during a relationship and may be shared without consent after-
wards. Intimate social knowledge negates certain forms of authenti-
cation, which often rely on knowledge of a person’s history and
social life, under the assumption that attackers would not have ac-
cess to such information. Some banks authenticate users by asking
them for prior addresses; security questions often seek information
like a mother’s maiden name, a favorite pet or teacher, or a birth-
day. These types of information, of course, are commonly shared
with one’s intimates. One of Facebook’s backup authentication sys-
tems involves showing the person photographs of people and requir-
ing them to accurately identify the ones they know [102]. This is
something an intimate partner or family member can do as well. In
one recently publicized incident, an Australian woman’s ex-
boyfriend stalked her with the assistance of an app integrated with
her vehicle, which reported her location to him; because he’d helped
her purchase the vehicle, he had access to the car’s registration infor-
mation [103].
What’s more, thick relational ties complicate amelioration of
privacy threats, and create leverage for the attacker. A distant hack-
er likely has no knowledge of a person’s immigration status, health
conditions, or personal “dirt” that can be exposed to others online;
an intimate associate has access to all of these [6]. Partners may also
have access to intimate photos of each other, enabling revenge porn.
Control over a spouse’s finances, a child’s curfew, or an elderly rela-
tive’s ability to live at home further gives the intimate attacker con-
trol; all of these may be conditioned on intimate monitoring, further
complicating consent and amelioration.
Implications for policy and design
While many of the threats we have described here are technically un-
sophisticated, we should not misread this as an indication that they
are easy to solve. The social complexity and heterogeneity underly-
ing intimate threats make them very challenging to address technic-
ally—which is, perhaps, why they are often ignored by engineers
and designers. (Other researchers have pointed out the very low pro-
portion of cybersecurity professionals who are women and minor-
ities, and have suggested that this lack of representation may also
lead to underemphasis on threats predominantly experienced by
those groups [104].). Intimate privacy invasions are often diffuse
and covert, unlike the high-profile data breaches regularly reported
in the news and may therefore also garner less attention and concern
in system design.
Some aspects of this problem must be mitigated by law and pol-
icy. A recent Citizen Lab report on stalkerware concluded with a list
of detailed policy recommendations to regulate that industry [49].
Further, we need increased penalties for abuse cases that include
digital tracking. Eva Galperin of the Electronic Frontier Foundation
has called on US law enforcement to prosecute stalkerware compa-
nies on hacking charges [105]. Legal scholar Danielle Citron has
also articulated a policy agenda to increase civil and criminal penal-
ties against these companies, and to increase digital forensic training
for state and local agencies [38]. Some laws have attempted to crim-
inalize the usage of more general IoT devices for surveillance
purposes.
The degree to which system designers should be held morally re-
sponsible—or legally liable—for every misuse of the technologies
they develop is a policy question without easy answers, particularly
for general purpose technologies put to unintended uses, and we do
not attempt to address it here. However, by taking intimate threat
models seriously from the outset, system designers can take some
steps to proactively mitigate the risks of intimate partner threats.
Importantly, many forms of design may have important roles to
play in this mitigation, from visual aspects of a user interface to core
system functionalities, and including both the design of physical
“things” and of information flows and processes [106].
All engineering involves trade-offs, involving both security and
functionality. The same capability that allows a parent to monitor
where their child goes online can also allow a spouse to monitor
their partner. And some attacks simply can’t be detected by technol-
ogy: a remote website, for example, will very likely not be able to
tell when someone is authenticating under the duress of threatened
physical violence from an abuser. It is not our intention to demand
that system designers prioritize intimate privacy threats ahead of all
other design considerations. Rather, by bringing to the fore consid-
erations about an underspecified privacy threat, we suggest that
designers take into account the concerns described in this article dur-
ing systems design, understanding that they will need to be weighed
against other goals and requirements.
Figure 1 offers a heuristic for understanding common relation-
ships between the features of intimate threats and their design impli-
cations. It summarizes the four common features of intimate threats
we have described in the previous section, and how recognition of
these features might inform more thoughtful design. We offer the
heuristic not as a definitive, exhaustive list, but as an analytic guide
for assessing the risks of intimate threats, the resources they bring to
bear, and potential remediations against them. We also do not claim
that any one feature is necessarily exclusive to intimate threats—in-
deed, some are shared by other contexts of insider attack, for ex-
ample—but we believe the constellation of features we describe here
is distinctive enough to merit treating intimate threats as their own
class of privacy threat.
With all this in mind, we offer the following general design con-
siderations, drawing from the common features we have enumer-
ated, for system designers to help prevent and ameliorate intimate
threats.
Implication 1: Recognize privacy in intimate contexts as
a balance among multiple interests and values
As we have discussed, some degree of monitoring is inevitable, desir-
able, and perhaps even necessary in intimate relationships.
Designing for intimate privacy means acknowledging this and find-
ing ways to balance among legitimate interests in privacy protection,
safety and caretaking, trust and closeness, and authority—while also
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acknowledging that these interests may carry very different weights
across different relationships, cultures, and points in time.
There are some good examples of tools that strike this difficult
balance well. For example, Licenseþ is a teen driver monitoring app
that aims to provide parents with “just the right amount of informa-
tion so they can stay up-to-date. . .and the driver doesn’t feel spied
on” [107]. This is accomplished by giving parents access to a teen’s
city-level location data (not finer-grained GPS coordinates) and
bounding use of the app to 100 total hours—enough to coach new
drivers into good practices, but not enough to surveil them indefin-
itely. The design of the app recognizes parents’ legitimate interests
in their children’s safety, but balances that against a teen’s desire for
privacy. Balancing these competing interests is difficult and context-
specific; a good first step is simply to specify and acknowledge the
values at stake and how they may be in tension with one another.
Implication 2: Recognize different data sensitivities to
intimate threats
Intimate threats may have impacts on the types of data that require
extra protection. For example, location data, friends lists, calendar
data, and communications are likely targets for an intimate attacker,
who wants to know where the victim is and with whom they are
talking [108]. Data that are normally considered sensitive (like fi-
nancial account numbers and identification information) may or
may not be as salient given an intimate attacker’s motivations.4
Intimate attacks can also intersect with more conventional priv-
acy concerns in non-obvious ways. For example, a victim might
regularly receive confidential information in the course of their
work: for example, as a doctor, lawyer, or therapist. This informa-
tion might be accessed as part of an intimate attack, and then either
disclosed or used as a coercive lever. Traditional threat models often
fail in these contexts, and system designers should consider whether
they have addressed threats against sensitive data from an intimate
perspective, and not just a financial or political one.
Implication 3: Evaluate what information may be
inadvertently transmitted through visual display
As we have discussed, some intimate privacy threats occur by virtue
of copresence between victim, attacker, and device. Designers
should be attentive to what information is displayed visually on the
user interface, recognizing that this can be a vector for a privacy
breach. Such disclosures are likely to be inadvertent on the part of
the user, and information may be actively or passively received by
an intimate adversary. In either case, these common disclosures
demonstrate how a device can inadvertently divulge information
that its owner may prefer to keep private [110, 111].
For example, most mobile operating systems display the content
and sender of text messages on the lock screen of a device by default,
as well as playing an audio alert indicating that a message has been
received. When another app is in use, iOS displays an incoming text
as a notification at the top of the screen. Operating systems on lap-
top and desktop computers also commonly display headers of in-
coming emails, text messages, Twitter direct messages, or other
forms of contacts on-screen as they come in. Such design choices,
while intended to be convenient for users, often lead to disclosures
of private information when a device screen is in view of another
person. Because such notifications typically “push” instantly upon
receipt of a message, they further reduce a user’s capacity to manage
her privacy temporally (e.g., receiving notifications when she can
view them without the presence of an intimate).
Targeted online ads are another example. Much can be inferred
about a person’s interests and characteristics based on what ads are
Figure 1: Some common features of intimate threats and their design implications. The list offered here is non-exhaustive but offers a heuristic for thinking about
designing with intimate threats in mind. The arrows in the diagram are intended to indicate what design considerations we consider to be especially salient in the
presence of particular threat features.
4 However, see findings suggesting that users have similar reported data-
type sensitivities for insider (i.e., friend) access as stranger access [109].
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targeted to them. If a browser is shared between family members,
ads may “follow” a user around the web and could, quite by acci-
dent, reveal to subsequent users what sorts of things a parent, child,
or intimate partner has been searching for [112]. Predictive features
can also be revealing if viewed visually. Many systems predict recipi-
ents of communications based on previous activity. iOS suggests
recipients of texts based, presumably, on the frequency and recency
of contacts with them; Google Inbox’s interface similarly suggests
frequent contacts when new messages are being composed.
Predictive text within conversations can be similarly disclosive. For
instance, iOS’s personalized autocorrect dictionary learns and sug-
gests proper names, such as contacts’ names, which may reveal in-
formation about a user’s communication patterns should another
person see or use the device.
When Firefox first introduced its private browsing feature, it
was indicated by a purple bar across the browser window. This
could by easily noticed from across the room, making it harder for
someone in the same physical location as another to use the feature
without it being obvious. Firefox has since changed the indication to
a more discreet purple circle in the upper-right corner of the browser
window. Apple’s Safari is still problematic: when the user enables
private browsing, the normally white address bar turns grey. A bet-
ter design would be to allow the user to disable any visual indication
of private browsing. Other researchers propose inconspicuous forms
of data entry, including haptic modalities and coded information
[113].
There are other contexts in which designers are attentive to vis-
ual privacy invasion without significantly impeding usability. ATMs
are designed with keyboard blockers to allow PINs to be entered pri-
vately; most websites mask entered passwords as bullets to prevent
them from being revealed to screen onlookers [97]. Security mecha-
nisms for the visually impaired are particularly attentive to visual
and aural eavesdropping; Azenkot et al. [114] developed a multi-
touch authentication method to protect against these risks. Google
researchers developed a facial–recognition–based security feature to
alert smartphone users when a gaze other than the user’s is detected
looking at the screen [115]. Mac laptops turn off visual notifications
when the display is being projected externally, in recognition of the
fact that users showing their screen to a group likely do not want
their private messages displayed. The NCAA built a “boss button”
into its March Madness streaming site: if employees are watching
basketball at work and the boss walks by, they can click the button
and an unremarkable spreadsheet pops up temporarily to create the
appearance of productivity [116]. Similar “escape” features appear
on some intimate partner violence resource sites, to take the user to
a generic webpage should an abuser walk into the room.
Implication 4: Recognize the importance of default-
setting and the “blank slate” problem
Privacy defaults are important in all contexts: in general, people are
unlikely to change the default settings of a system or service, due to
inattention, lack of awareness, or technical difficulty. But in intim-
ate contexts, default-setting is even more important. The launch of
Google Buzz in 2010 serves as an illustrative example of the power
of defaults. This early microblogging service automatically created a
circle of friends for new users based on their most frequent email
and chat contacts in Gmail. This was a privacy disaster for many in
(or having left) abusive relationships, in some cases leading to phys-
ical endangerment for abuse survivors [117]. Having a different de-
fault would have prevented this problem from arising.
Furthermore: in intimate contexts, even when disclosive settings
can be manually overridden by the user, overriding a default can it-
self create suspicion that the user has something to hide [6]. In most
contexts, if an attacker compromises an account or device, we ad-
vise the victim to change the access credentials, to open a new ac-
count, to cut up the credit card, or otherwise to insulate themselves
from the invasion. But in intimate contexts, this is fraught advice,
given its limited effectiveness and the risks of escalation. Changing
settings to protect one’s privacy might be a dangerous “tell,” signal-
ing that the victim does not trust the attacker. Therefore, even tak-
ing steps to protect oneself against privacy invasion can create
danger.
We call this the “blank slate” problem: removing an attacker’s
access to data, without plausible deniability, may be the worst thing
one can do. In abusive relationships, enabling additional privacy
protections may result in escalating levels of abuse, thus further
endangering the victim. The assumption that one has nothing to
hide and thus will not take steps to protect their privacy is an ex-
ample of what Marques et al. [19] term “performative
vulnerability”: taking too many affirmative steps to prevent anoth-
er’s access suggests a lack of trust. The same can be true of explicit
conversations about access expectations. Stuart Schechter points out
that “least privilege may be among the most sacred and respected
principles of information security, but starting a conversation on ap-
propriate use of household resources by informing children that
their privileges are restricted to a prescribed set of allowable behav-
iors is a sure way to incite or escalate a conflict” [118]. More gener-
ally, the lack of trust that is often the foundation of an effective
privacy policy can actively erode relations between intimate part-
ners, family, and friends.
In this vein, Griggio et al. [55] advocate for allowing “discreet
changes to privacy preferences” to avoid the unwanted communica-
tive aspect of turning on a privacy setting against an intimate part-
ner. Apple’s iOS offers an example in clear contravention of this
advice. When Alice takes an affirmative step to stop sharing her lo-
cation information with Bob, Bob is explicitly notified in the
iMessage chat that “Alice has stopped sharing location with you.”
This setting, which is not to our knowledge overridable by users,
may pose real danger to users trying to protect themselves from in-
timate threats.
Implication 5: Recognize that privacy and sharing
preferences are dynamic
System designers should take into account that sharing preferences
will change: couples will break up, children will grow up, room-
mates will move in and out [12, 100]. Over the course of relation-
ships, intimates’ uses of technology and their sharing and privacy
preferences are likely to evolve to best suit their current relational
aims. And more broadly, sharing norms and societal privacy expect-
ations change over time. Technologies that fail to allow for change
run the risk of ossifying outdated privacy expectations to the detri-
ment of users’ current preferences.
This fluidity has two primary implications for designers. First, to
the greatest extent possible, systems should accommodate changes
to preferences. The ability to make discreet changes to privacy set-
tings, discussed above in implication 4, is one aspect of this flexibil-
ity; designers may also take steps to avoid the ossification of sharing
preferences, for example, by periodically prompting users to ensure
that preferences have not changed and that they are aware of what
is being shared.
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Second, intimate privacy threats often become most salient at
discrete moments of relationship transition [7, 54]. Systems should
support users when they try to separate joint accounts and help ac-
count owners monitor their accounts for login attempts by ex-
partners. This means recognizing and accounting for changing priv-
acy preferences over time, not just at the discrete moment of account
setup. Facebook has taken some positive steps in this regard. When
a user changes their relationship status on the site to indicate a
breakup, Facebook proactively displays a prompt asking them if
they wish to adjust privacy settings with respect to the ex-partner
(for example, hiding future posts from their ex, untagging their ex in
past posts) [119].
Implication 6: Realize that households are not units;
devices are not personal; the purchaser of a product is
not its only user
System designers build in assumptions about intrafamilial privacy
expectations, and often treat a household as a “unit” for purposes
of information sharing. These assumptions are incorrect if a privacy
threat comes from within one’s own household. Often when an ac-
count is shared (a cell phone family plan, a TV streaming subscrip-
tion, a smart home service, health insurance coverage), all users’
data associated with that account is accessible to whoever is respon-
sible for payment. But this need not be the case. For example, a sin-
gle Netflix account is regularly shared amongst an entire household,
even though individual users may watch content on different
screens. Netflix’s security architecture supports multiple profiles in
one account, but there is no privacy between them [120]. On the
other hand, YouTube TV also supports multiple profiles, but allows
those profiles to be individually password-protected, enabling peo-
ple in a household to better balance their individual needs for shar-
ing and privacy (see also [121]).
Similar failures may occur when households share common
channels for information transmission. This often arises when infor-
mation collected from Internet use is transferred to the real world.
Unsolicited email is delivered to an individual email box, while un-
solicited paper is delivered to a (shared) household physical mail-
box. This difference was illustrated in a widely read privacy
anecdote where Target Corporation deduced that a young woman
was pregnant and sent her a paper flyer with baby-related offers,
alerting the woman’s father to the pregnancy before she told him
[122]. Similarly, Pakistani law enforcement assures legal adult vic-
tims of cyber-harassment of confidentiality when they register com-
plaints online, but then delivers further communication to the
victim’s house—which is predominantly a family home [123]. A
similar issue can occur in cars, which increasingly offer a Bluetooth
interface to connect with the driver’s phone—and may announce
when and from whom a driver receives a text message or a phone
call, despite the fact that the car is often a shared space. Smart home
technologies present particular challenges in this regard; taking steps
like providing visible indicators of data capture (e.g., lights that
flash when audio or video is being recorded) can be one way to
allow multiple users with divergent privacy preferences to better
protect their privacy interests vis-a`-vis one another [100, 124].
The converse of the above assumption is that devices considered
“personal” are used by only one person. But abundant research
demonstrates that this is often not the case, and that device sharing
can facilitate unwanted information disclosure [16, 125]. For ex-
ample, many user interfaces offer seamless integration of content
across devices, under the apparent assumption that each of a user’s
devices will be used by that user alone. For instance, if a user has an
iCloud account to which two devices—say, an iPhone and an iPad—
are registered, iOS will by default sync iMessages across both devi-
ces. But in a family, devices are often shared, rather than being used
solely by one iCloud registrant. The seamlessness of this integration
fails to realistically reflect typical device usage patterns, and can fa-
cilitate inadvertent disclosures in so doing.
System designers should design with all potential users’ privacy
in mind. Companies have a market incentive to build devices for the
benefit of the paying customer. But if the use of a device increases
privacy risk to another person who is not the direct customer, the
interests of that person must be protected as well.
Most fundamentally, data access should not be covert. An app to
monitor a loved one’s cell phone that has no visible icon seems more
likely to be used without consent than one that reveals itself [48].
Another approach to preventing covert access is to leave an “access
trail” letting users know when their data has been viewed. For ex-
ample, in Norway, all salary data is public—but searches can’t be
conducted anonymously, and people can see who has viewed their
salary [126]. Facebook employees similarly get a “Sauron alert”
from the company if a colleague accesses their account [127].
Though measures like these do not prevent access, they do prevent
covert access, making it more likely that privacy preferences will be
governed by social and relational norms. Improving the discover-
ability of monitoring is not a silver bullet to the problem of intimate
privacy threat, but it can be a useful tool to help prevent and provide
recourse against unwanted surveillance.
Conclusion
Data gathering in intimate relationships is likely to increase in the
near future, both due to the increased digital traces on social media
and the proliferation of data-gathering devices in homes. An enor-
mous number of consumer IoT products are explicitly marketed for
the protection, supervision, and care of intimates [28]. Even IoT
devices that are not specifically so marketed often allow us to draw
inferences about an intimate’s activities, and often without their
awareness [128]: web-enabled security cameras that capture the
behaviors of anyone in the home [129], or the sleep tracker that
records the activities of anyone using the bed [52]. The growth of
this consumer market and the continuing normalization of monitor-
ing across intimate relationships makes this a class of threats to be
taken seriously.
There are some signs that intimate threats are beginning to be
recognized by the tech industry. For example, Kaspersky recently
announced an effort to alert users to the presence of stalkerware
apps covertly installed on Android products [130], and Google
made some efforts to scrub similar apps from its Play Store follow-
ing research about their prevalence [48]. We take heart at these
developments, but suggest that consideration of intimate threat
models should be more thoroughly integrated into system design
broadly, rather than only in response to the most egregious apps for
covert intimate monitoring.
Addressing these threats not only extends the field of cybersecur-
ity to meet the needs of vulnerable communities, but also brings it
into fruitful dialogue with other disciplines and modes of inquiry. It
requires an integrated sociotechnical approach to understanding
privacy. It requires focusing our attention both on new problems
and new tools for addressing them, taking seriously the social and
cultural sites within which technologies and users are situated, and
acknowledging the full range of harms privacy threats can pose. It
requires thinking more broadly about how we design secure systems.
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By recognizing the class of intimate threats and characterizing their
common features, we can begin to articulate design principles to ad-
dress them.
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